In her letter, the Secretary of State said:
I am particularly concerned about the possible negative consequences for the many U.S. citizens who live and travel abroad. The execution of Mr. Breard in the present circumstances could lead some countries to contend incorrectly that the U.S. does not take seriously its obligations under the Convention. The immediate execution of Mr. Breard in the face of the Court's April 9 action could be seen as a denial by the United States of the significance of international law and the Court's processes in its international relations and thereby limit our ability to ensure that Americans are protected when living or traveling abroad."
She did not, however, say that for all those reasons the United States had decided to comply with the provisional measures indicated by the I.C.J. to stay the execution and was so notifying the governor. Rather, she wrote, "[i]n light of the Court's request, the unique and difficult foreign policy issues, and other problems created by the Court's provisional measures, Itherefore request that you exercise your powers as Governor and stay Mr. Breard's execution." 5 Moreover, she added, "[i]t is only with great reluctance that I make this request." 6 In its brief to the Supreme Court, signed by the Legal Adviser, the U.S. government took the position that it could not require Virginia to stay the execution. After arguing that the I.C.J. decision is "precatory rather than mandatory," the brief states:
But in any event, the "measures at [the government 's] disposal" are a matter of domestic United States law, and our federal system imposes limits on the federal government's ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the States. The "measures at [the United States'] disposal" under our Constitution may in some cases include only persuasion-such as the Secretary of State's request to the Governor of Virginia to stay Breard's execution-and not legal compulsion through the judicial system. That is the 4. LetterfromMadeleine Albright, Secretary ofState, UnitedSiatesDepartment ofState, to James Gilmore, Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998) (copy on file with author).
Id. (emphasis added).
6. Id. 
II.
It may well be, as the United States government argued, that (1) "there is no basis for concluding that the asgistance of a consular officer would have changed the outcome of the criminal proceedings," 9 and that (2) "the remedy Paraguay seeks-[setting aside the conviction]-is not supported by the Convention's text, its negotiating history, or the subsequent practice of state parties."'" Further, that (3) Breard's failure to raise the issue earlier precluded him from raising it on federal habeas corpus and that (4) the Eleventh Amendment precluded the action by Paraguay. But none of these arguments dispose of the question whether the United States government had the constitutional authority to require Virginia to stay the execution. I believe that it did. It is unthinkable that the federal government lacks the power under the Constitution to comply with an order of the International Court of Justice, precatory or mandatory, if it determines that it is in the interest of the United States to do so. I also believe, contrary to the views expressed by the European Court in the Soering case," that federal authorities do have legally binding power to provide, in an appropriate extradition case, that the death 
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penalty will not be imposed or carried out. 2 Article VI of the Constitution provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' 3 The Soering case involved an extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. The Breard case involves three treaties to which the United States is a party: the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 4 the U.N. Charter," and the Statute of the International Court of Justice.' 6 These treaties are all clearly within the treaty power of the United States. They all deal with matters that have traditionally been the subject of treaties and that are clearly of international concern.' Nor are states' rights a limitation on the treaty power. That view was rejected by the Supreme Court over a half century ago." Missouri v. Holland makes clear that the United States may enter into treaties on matters that are otherwise exclusively within the jurisdiction of the states and that Congress may enact legislation to implement a treaty even if in the absence of the treaty it could not regulate the conduct. Thus, there can be no doubt that Congress could adopt legislation to implement these treaties and that such legislation would supersede state law.' 9 For example, Congress could adopt legislation providing that whenever an extradition treaty permits a contracting party to condition extradition on a promise that the death penalty will not be imposed, the Secretary of State may make such a commitment and that that commitment
12.
See infra text at notes 20-28. 
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a valid executive agreemene 2 and that executive agreements, like treaties, supersede inconsistent state law. 23 In Belmont 24 and Pink" 5 the Supreme Court held that an exchange of notes between Litvinov, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whereby the United States recognized the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union assigned its claims to property located in the United States to the United States, constituted an executive agreement. Moreover, that agreement superseded New York law, which denied effect to confiscatory takings. In Belmont the Court said:
[C]omplete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states. In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does not exist. 2 6 In Pink the Supreme Court stated:
We repeat that there are limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively. It need not be so exercised as to conform to state laws or state policies, whether they be expressed in constitutions, statutes, or judicial decrees. And the policies of the States become wholly irrelevant to judicial inquiry when the United States, acting within its constitutional sphere, seeks enforcement of its foreign policy in the courts.27
The agreement in Belmont and Pink was a sole executive agreement. The President's authority to enter that agreement stemmed from the President's power to recognize foreign governments. If, as the Supreme Court held in the Belmont and Pink cases, an executive agreement based on the President's authority to recognize foreign governments-an authority that is [Vol. 10:1 not even mentioned in the Constitution but derived from the President's authority to receive ambassadors 2 --is sufficient to supersede state laws, a fortiori an executive agreement implementing a treaty entered into by the President with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, on matters that are clearly within the treaty power of the United States, is sufficient to supersede state law.
As a policy matter, the federal government may prefer not to grant assurances concerning the imposition of the death penalty in state criminal cases, leaving it to each state to decide whether it wishes to give the requested assurances or to forego the extradition. 29 It is unlikely, however, that as a policy matter the United States would prefer to leave it to each state to decide whether to comply with an order of the International Court of Justice. 3 mI.
Nor should the federal government's authority to implement an I.C.J. decision depend on whether the decision is mandatory or precatory. In opposing the stay of execution, the government argued that an order indicating provisional remedies is not binding, that the language of Article 41 (1) of the I.C.J. statute is precatory. 3 " The implication seems to be that if the decision were binding the federal government could implement it, but because it is not, the government cannot implement it. Commentators differ on whether I.C.J.
Professor Henkin notes that "[w]
hile making treaties and appointing ambassadors are described as 'powers' of the President (Article 11, section 2), receiving ambassadors is included in section 3 which does not speak in terms of power but lists things the President 'shall' or 'may' do." Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAiRS AND THE CONSTITrrTION 41 (1972). Hamilton characterized the President's receiving ambassadors as "more a matter of dignity than of authority" and as "a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of government." THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 388 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 461-62 (1998) . Shabtai Rosenne, one of the leading authorities on the I.C.J., appears to take the position that there is an obligation to comply with a provisional order. See ROSENNE, supra, § 1.48, at 240 (although a provisional "order is not on the same footing as a judgment from the point of view of the Security Council's powers under Article 94 of the Charter, . .. it is a decision and, so long as it is in force, it comes within the conventional and customary obligations to comply with the decision of the Court, incumbent upon every litigating State.").
Following the European Court offluman Rights decision in the
33. The policy considerations generally given in support of federal supremacy, such as the need for uniformity,' 3 that the consequences of any action "will be felt by the nation as a whole,"' or the "potential for disruption doctrine constitutes a breach of international obligation.
Id. at 421-22 (citations omitted).
38. Moreover, whatever the distinction between "precatory" and "mandatory," the United States clearly believes that provisional measures impose some obligation on states. In the hostage crisis, the United States government? If that government has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this, done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit to the States the acts for which it is held responsible? Id. at 279-80. See also, 71m FEDERAUST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton stated:
[TI]he peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or perversion ofjustice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith than to the security of the public tranquillity. A distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties and the law of nations and those which may stand merely on the footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States. But it is at least problematical whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulation in a treaty or the general law of nations. THE FEDERAUST No. 80, at 444-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999 The Security Council adopted a resolution which "deplored the continued detention of the hostages contrary to Security Council Resolution 457 (1979) 
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efforts by the United States to gain release of the hostages, said, the most important of these efforts was our institution of the present proceeding before this Court.... [A]t the time we filed our application we had in mind that as a member of the United Nations, fran had finally undertaken, pursuant to Article 94, paragraph 1, of the U.N. Charter, to comply with the decisions of this Court in any case to which Iran might be a party. Accordingly, it was the hope and expectation of the United States that the Government of Iran, in compliance with its formal commitments and obligations, would obey any and all orders andjudgments which might be entered by this Court in the course of the present litigation."
The very fact that the matter is the subject of a treaty brings it within the scope of federal authority. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, in a variety of contexts, that in matters that affect foreign affairs the federal government is supreme 5 " and that in the realm of foreign affairs, "with its 49. Robert B. Owen, Oral Argument before the I.C.J. (Mar. 18, 1980) , reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., May 1980, at 42 (emphasis added). Owen did, however, draw a distinction between provisional measures and ajudgment on the merits. In explaining why the Court should enter ajudgment directing Iran "to take specific action to terminate its continuing unlawful conduct," even though Iran had disregarded the order indicating provisional measures, Owen said, I am keenly aware of the fact that at an earlier stage in this case we asked the Court for somewhat similar relief in the form of provisional measures and that Iran's subsequent refusal to comply with the resulting provisional measures has surely created doubt as to whether it will comply with the final judgment of this Court. In response, I will simply draw an obvious legal distinction. Within the communityofinternational legal scholars there is at least some doubt as to whether an indication of provisional measures under article 41 of the Court's Statute is binding and enforceable, but there can be no equivalent doubt about ajudgment of the Court on the merits. Conceivably, the authorities in Iran have felt that they were not legally bound by the provisional measures indicated by the Court on 15 December. But article 94 of the U.N. Charter specifically requires obedience to the final judgment on the merits and provides for its enforcement. important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."'" The decision whether to comply with the I.C.J. order in the Breard case clearly implicates American foreign relations. In her letter to the governor of Virginia, the Secretary of State spoke of the "unique and difficult foreign policy issues" involved and "the possible negative consequences for the many U.S. citizens who live and travel abroad." 52 She stressed that the immediate execution of Breard could be seen by other states "as a denial by the United States of the significance of international law" and could "limit our ability to ensure that Americans are protected when living or traveling abroad." 3 In response to a question following a speech at Howard University, the Secretary of State said, "it is very important... to assure ourselves that our citizens, were they to find themselves in any trouble whenever abroad,... would be accorded these rights." ' 5 4 It is inconceivable that had these arguments been made by the United States in the Supreme Court in support of a stay it would have been denied.
IV.
In sum, I believe that based on Article VI of the Constitution and a long line of Supreme Court decisions, the United States had the authority to comply with the decision of the I.C.J. indicating provisional measures. The Executive could have done so in a number of ways. First, had the Secretary of State informed Virginia that the Executive had decided to comply with the order of the I.C.J. and that Virginia was required to stay the execution, Virginia would in all probability have complied. Alternatively, had the United States taken the position in the Supreme Court that the President had decided to comply with the order of the I.C.J. and asked the Court to stay the execution pending a decision on the merits, the Court probably would have done so. The Supreme Court has long deferred to the State Department on matters involving that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.") (emphasis added); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power over external affairs . .. is vested exclusively in the national government.") (emphasis added).
51. 
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foreign affairs," 5 and in this case the Court specifically requested the views of the government. 6 Conversely, the Executive's failure to request a stay made it unlikely that the Court would do so given its strong deference to the Executive on matters of foreign affairs. 7 Finally, the government could have brought an action to enjoin the execution." 8 The United States has standing to bring an action to "carry out our treaty obligations" and no statute was necessary to authorize the suit. 9 Whichever approach the government chose, the obligations of the United States under the Consular Convention, the U.N. Charter, and the Statute of the International Court of Justice provided ample basis for the assertion of federal authority over the matter. But, if the Executive had any doubt that it had the authority based on these treaties alone, because they do not provide explicitly for the implementation of I.C. 929 (4th Cir. 1964 ) (noting that the United States can bring action to enforce its policies where national interest is involved; it need not have statutory authorization). In the latter case, involving the improper imposition of property tax on a member of the armed forces, the court said,
Here we find that the interest of the national government in the proper implementation of its policies and programs involving the national defense is such as to vest in it the non-statutory right to maintain this action. Under these circumstances the incapacity of the individual plaintiff to maintain his action is immaterial since he may find shelter under the Government's umbrella. The Breard case raised interesting and important questions about the limits of habeas corpus under the new statute and about the scope of the Eleventh Amendment. But, perhaps the most important question it raised is whether the United States has the constitutional authority to ensure compliance with judgments of the International Court of Justice or must leave that to the decision of each state. It would seem that to state the question is to answer it. It is unthinkable that the federal government would not have the authority. Missouri v. Holland, Belmont, and Pink make clear that it does. Yet, the government took the position in Breard that it lacked the authority. That is, perhaps, the most troubling aspect of the case. That is exactly what the Executive did in the Arlington case. In that case the United States entered into an agreement with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1974, which established diplomatic relations between the two countries, but which apparently did not provide for tax exemption for property used for residential purposes. Virginia imposed a tax on such property owned by the GDR, obtained a judgment against the GDR, and imposed a lien on the property. When the GDR protested to the State Department, the United States entered into an agreement with the GDR, signed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, which provided for tax exemption for property "used exclusively for purposes of their diplomatic missions, including residences for the staff of their diplomatic missions .. " Id. at 928. The United States then brought an action for a declaratoryjudgment voiding the assessments and liensand an injunction prohibiting the county from further attempts to collect the taxes. The Court of Appeals held that the United States could "sue to enforce its policies and laws"; that the 1974 and 1979 agreements between the United States and the GDR must be accorded "the dignity of formal treaties," id. at 932, and that Virginia could not tax the property.
